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Hobbes on the Order of Sciences
A Partial Defense of the Mathematization Thesis
z v i b i e n e r *
u n i v e r s i t y o f c i n c i n n at i
Abtract. Accounts of Hobbes’s ‘system’ of sciences oscillate between two extremes.
On one extreme, the system is portrayed as wholly axiomatic-deductive, with state-
craft being deduced in an unbroken chain from the principles of logic and rst
philosophy. On the other, it is portrayed as rife with conceptual cracks and ssures,
with Hobbes’s statements about its deductive structure amounting to mere window-
dressing. This paper argues that a middle way is found by conceiving of Hobbes’s
Elements of Philosophy on the model of a mixed-mathematical science, not the model
provided by Euclid’s Elements of Geometry. I suggest that Hobbes is a test case for
understanding early-modern system-construction more generally, as inspired by
the structure of the applied mathematical sciences. This approach has the additional
virtue of bolstering, in a novel way, the thesis that the transformation of philosophy
in the long seventeenth century was heavily indebted to mathematics, a thesis that
has increasingly come under attack in recent years.
1. i n t r o d u c t i o n
The idea that mathematics was central to the transformation of philosophy in the long
seventeenth century is well known. It has roots in several twentieth-century polymaths—
Alexandre Koyré, E. A. Burtt, and E. J. Dijksterhuis—and has been with us long enough that
it is considered a conservative historiographical device.1 But scholars have increasingly
disputed its truth. They argue that much early-modern philosophical production was
anti-mathematical both in theory and practice. Mordecai Feingold, for example, shows
that those who accepted the primacy of mathematics in natural philosophy were “a
divisive clique that had little in common with the interests and concerns of the generality
of membership” of the Royal Society.2 Roger Ariew, for another example, shows that the
*I thank Peter Machamer and the participants of the 2010 National Endowment for the Humanities
Summer Seminar on Galileo, Descartes, and Hobbes, lead by Dan Garber and Roger Ariew, for comments on
the rst version of this paper. For extensive comments on later drafts, I thank Marcus Adams, who has been
independently working on understanding Hobbes’s natural philosophy in terms of mixed-mathematics. I
also thank two anonymous referees for their perceptive comments. Final work was generously supported by
the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center Fellowship Program, at the University of Cincinnati.
1Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science; Koyré, Études Galiléennes; Dijksterhius,
The Mechanization of the World Picture; Cohen, The Scientic Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, Ch. 2.
2Feingold, “Mathematicians and Naturalists,” 78.
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varieties of Cartesianism demonstrate that the adoption of mathematical techniques was
not central even to those who accepted a good deal of Cartesian metaphysics.3 Finally,
Daniel Garber shows that the concept of a “law of nature”—a decidedly mathematical
one from a contemporary perspective—had a history that is largely distinct from the
history of mathematization.4 These are not claims about peripheral counter-currents
in the scientic revolution, they are about its core. They thus leave us with a problem:
if the use of mathematics was not essential to the transformation of philosophy in the
seventeenth century, what becomes of the mathematization thesis?
In this essay I mount a programmatic, partial defense of the mathematization thesis.
My defense consists of two intertwining claims: rst, many discussions of the thesis
wrongly characterize, if only by lack of attention, the extension of the term ‘mathematics’
in early modernity; second, this mischaracterization leads us to underappreciate one
manner in which mathematics was was important for philosophy. I use Hobbes as a test
case. My defense is partial because I only outline enough of the Hobbesian background
to articulate the main claim; a full defense would require much more. Moreover, I do
not intend to resuscitate the idea that mathematization was the engine of the scientic
revolution. I only wish to show that mathematics played an underappreciated, but
determinative role in the thought of one philosopher. While I believe that we can nd
similar instances in works of others, I cannot address them here.5 To spell out what is
underappreciated in the early-modern use of mathematics, I need to bring up another
common element of early-modern philosophy.
It is well known that the project of constructing a ‘system’ of knowledge—a set of
theses capable of integrating all that is and could possibly be known—was common to
many early-modern philosophers. The most famous are perhaps Hobbes and Spinoza,
although they were certainly not the only ones who tried to construct bodies of knowledge
that consistently accounted for both experimental and abstract theses. That unity has
been often understood in terms of mathematics. Mathematics, the idea goes, provided
the organizing principle for philosophical systems, whether or not mathematics also
provided the content of those systems. Thus, it was possible for Spinoza to champion
the geometrical manner as an organizing principle for philosophy, and still circumscribe
rather heavily the epistemic utility of mathematics.6 In fact, the idea that mathematics
provided a model for system construction is almost as prevalent as the mathematization
3Ariew, Descartes and the First Cartesians, Ch. 4.3.
4Garber, “Laws of Nature and the Mathematics of Motion.”
5See Biener, The Unity of Science in Early-Modernity: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical
Manner in Late Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes.
6The importance of the geometrical manner for Spinoza is a traditional, perhaps dated, position. Recent
literature argues that Spinoza thought that very little about reality could be understood through mathematics.
See Schliesser, “Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathematics, Motion and Being”; Peterman, “Spinoza
on Extension.”
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thesis itself. Importantly, however, this idea takes Euclidean geometry to provide the
relevant structure for studying philosophical systems, even when the philosophical
systems studied contained anti-mathematical theses and criticisms of Euclid himself.7
The following represent an orthodox position:
[I]t was Euclid and Archimedes who, fully in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle,
established mathematics and the natural sciences as axiomatic-deductive theories:
axiomatic in their fundamental principles, and deductive in their logical procedures.
Their work has so far been the model for Thomas Hobbes (Politics), Baruch de
Spinoza (Ethics), Leibniz (Jurisprudence), William Whiston (Cosmology) and many
more, and has thus become the unique paradigm for strict science in the Western
sense: as science ‘more geometrico’.8
What few noticed, however, is that this view of system construction reinforces skepticism
about the mathematization thesis! For if we take the Euclidean model to be the aim of, say,
Hobbes and Spinoza, we must also announce them to be grand failures. Neither succeeded
in creating systems that are actually axiomatic-deductive. Spinoza presented his system
as axiomatic-deductive, but no student of Spinoza can feign that the claims of Book V of
the Ethics are deducible in an unbroken chain from the principles of metaphysics.
Hobbes did not present his system in a geometrical fashion, but it is equally hard
to nd a single line of reasoning that begins with the principles of De Corpore and ends
in statecraft. Nevertheless, I believe we can rescue him from failure, and we can do so
by amending the Euclidean model of system construction. By revising the extension of
the term ‘mathematics,’ we can see that what Hobbes, my example in this essay, tried
to emulate was dierent than the strict Euclidean model. Rather, he tried to emulate
a more exible mixed-mathematical model, and this model allows us to turn some of
his failures into successes. The two claims together establish that there is still room for
the mathematization thesis—at least as far as system construction is concerned—if we
properly revise what we understand by ‘mathematization.’ I begin by considering how
mathematics was used by Hobbes, in general.
7I mentioned Spinoza above. The same is true for Hobbes, who repeatedly criticized Euclid in Six Lessons.
Hobbes’s criticism, however, was not leveled at the Euclidean idea of demonstration or the propositional
structure of Euclidean geometry. Hobbes was mainly concerned with redening basic geometrical concepts
so that they reveal true causes. He also repeated praised Euclid, e.g., in the preface to De Corpore. For the
causal denitions Hobbes sees as missing from Euclid, see Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical Mind:
Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s Meditations.”
8Schönbeck, “Euclidean and Archimedean traditions in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,” 184.
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2. h o b b e s a n d g e o m e t r y
Hobbes was taken with mathematics, particularly with geometry. Although the story of
his Euclidean illumination is apocryphal and self-promulgated, his repeated statements
regarding his genuine respect for the eld and its importance for human knowledge are
numerous and well known.9 But what did Hobbes take from Geometry? What was it
about the eld that appeared to him so useful? There are several available answers. The
most cited holds that Hobbes took from geometry a certain conception of the resolutive
and compositive methods, a way of moving from consequences to antecedents to conse-
quences; or, given Hobbes’s refusal to segregate, and perhaps confusion between, reasons
and causes, a way of moving from eects to causes and back to eects.10 A second story is
that Hobbes took from geometry a respect for conceptual clarity, a respect for denitions
free of vagueness and confusion, and for signs that denote only such denitions. This
respect is usually discussed in the context of Hobbes’ theory of denition, but given the
primary role of denitions in Hobbes’ system, it extends to his philosophy as a whole.11
A third story is that Hobbes took from geometry an insistence on demonstrative inter-
subjectivity, on styles of proof that could be understood by everyone.12 A fourth story
concerns certainty, and so on.13 I don’t wish to dispute any of these, each emphasizes the
importance of mathematics in a dierent way.
But there is also another way Hobbes used geometry: as a model for system construc-
tion.14 This use is understudied, due to a kind of presentism. Much of the secondary
literature on Hobbes and geometry takes for granted that the extension of “geometry” is
known.15 It assumes that Hobbes understood by “geometry” simply that body of knowl-
9Aubrey, ‘Brief lives,’ chiey of contemporaries, set down by John Aubrey, between the Years of 1669 & 1696,
1:332; Berhardt, “Témoinage direct de Hobbes sur son ’illumination Euclidienne’.”
10Sacksteder, “Hobbes: Geometrical Objects”; Sacksteder, “Hobbes: The Art of the Geometricians”; Talaska,
“Analytic and Synthetic Method according to Hobbes”; Hattab, “Hobbes’s and Zabarella’s Methods: A
Missing Link”; Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s
Meditations.”
11Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s Medita-
tions”; Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, Ch. 2.
12Grant, “Geometry and Politics: Mathematics in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes”; P. K. Machamer, “The
Person-Centered Rhetoric of Seventeenth-Century Science.”
13Popkin, The third force in seventeenth-century thought, 9–49; Tuck, “Optics and sceptics: the philosophical
foundations of Hobbes’s political thought.”
14See also Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s
Meditations,” Adams, “Hobbes on Natural Philosophy as ’True Physics’ and Mixed Mathematics.”
15Historians of science have not make this error for several decades, but the presentism is still part of
work on Hobbes’s philosophy of language and politics, and thus often aects treatments of the unity of
his system; see, e.g., Daston et al., Natural Law and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence,
Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy, 7 and Deigh, “Reasons and Ethics in Hobbes’s Leviathan.” Mostly,
the problem is one of omission. By not specifying the extension of ‘geometry’ contemporary authors invite
misinterpretation. This presentism persists despite the fact that questions about the Euclidean structure
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edge explored in Euclid’s Elements, supplemented by the work of Apollonius, Pappus and
a few others. Of course, that Hobbes saw Euclid, Apollonius, and Pappus as the pillars of
geometry is not up for debate. Nevertheless, things are more complicated.
By the terms “mathematics” and “geometry,” early moderns in the long seventeenth
century referred to a wider set of disciplines than what we today understand by “mathe-
matics” and “geometry.” Galileo’s initial university title, for example, was “mathematician,”
yet his published work was not a straightforward development of what we nd in Euclid,
Apollonius, or Pappus. No contemporary objected that he did not deserve his title for that
reason. A broad understanding of the term was not unusual. Goclenius, for example, in
the 1613 Lexicon, wrote under the entry Mathematicae that not only geometry and arith-
metic, but also astronomy, optics, music and mechanics are accepted as “mathematics.”16
He then produced a table in which mathematics contains not only the four disciplines
just mentioned, but also architecture, geography, and others (Figure 1).
[width=0.7]/Users/zvb1/Dropbox/Projects/Hobbes/goclenius.pdf
Descartes, reporting on his youth in the Regulae ad directionem Ingenii, wrote:
When [I had been lead] from the particular study of arithmetic and geometry to
a general study of mathematics, I inquired rst of all precisely what everyone
means by this word, and why not only those two sciences of which we have already
spoken, but also music, optics, mechanics, and several others are called parts of
mathematics.17
Finally, Hobbes, in his commentary on White’s De Mundo of 1642–43, wrote:
Some parts of philosophy, such as astronomy, mechanics, optics, music, are mathe-
matical; others, still untouched, deal with quantity and number, not merely in theory
but with reference to the movement of celestial bodies or that of heavy ones, or to
the action of shining or sound-producing bodies; [these] must therefore be counted
among the mathematical sciences.18
When early-moderns referred to mathematics, they referred to both the pure and the
so-called mixed-mathematical sciences. They referred both to the work of Euclid, Apollo-
nius, and Pappus and to the work of Archimedes, Grosseteste, Benedetti, Brunelleschi,
of Hobbes’s system have long been part of the literature on Hobbes; see e.g., Schuhmann, “Le Short Tract,
premiere oeuvre philosophique de Hobbes,” although the authorship of Short Tract, Schuhmann’s subject,
is disputed. Although I ultimately disagree with Schumann’s conclusions about the origin of Hobbes’s
“structure,” I agree that the source is not straightforwardly Euclidean. I thank Marcus Adams for drawing the
Deighton piece to my attention.
16Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum, quo tanquam clave philosophicae fores aperiuntur .
17CSM, I 19; AT, X 377.
18Hobbes, Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined.
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Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and the large number of practitioners of ballistics, perspective,
tuning, navigation, and architecture that sprang up in the renaissance.19
We can now return to the initial question, reframed: what did Hobbes take from
geometry, if he also took geometry to be constituted by both pure geometry and the
variety of mixed-geometrical disciplines? How adding mixed geometry to the extension
of “geometry” changes the Hobbesian perspective on analysis and synthesis, or the
clarity, intersubjectivity, and certainty of mathematics is beyond our scope. In those areas
both pure geometry and mixed geometry can serve as exemplars, and so teasing out the
separate inuence of each type is no small feat.20 However, there is one lesson that Hobbes
could only have taken from mixed-geometry, one that is unavailable when geometry
is considered in its pure form. It concerns the structure of deductive inference, and,
given the importance of the deductive model for system-construction, the structure of his
philosophical system. My claim is that Hobbes took something regarding philosophical
system building from astronomy, optics, mechanics, and music. To see this, a brief
overview of the debates regarding the structure of the Hobbesian system is in order.
3. h o b b e s ’ s ‘ s y s t e m ’
The debates regarding the structure of the Hobbesian system oscillate between two
extremes mapped out decades ago. On the one hand, scholars endorse the demonstrative
unity of Hobbes’s system. Alan Ryan, for example, echoing earlier work by John Watkins,
writes:
Hobbes believes as rmly as one could that behaviour, whether of animate of
inanimate matter, was ultimately to be explained in terms of particular motion: the
laws governing the motions of discrete material particules were the ultimate laws of
nature, and in this sense psychology must be rooted in physiology and physiology
in physics, while the social sciences, especially the terminology of statecraft, must
be rooted in psychology.21
Such statements are easy to make, but explicitly tracing science to its roots is another
matter. Ryan’s focus on (some of) Hobbes’s pronouncements does not easily match
Hobbes’s actual practice. One is hard-pressed to nd the connection between, say,
Hobbes’s statecraft and physics, spelled out in his work. It is precisely such a mismatch
that leads to the other extreme of Hobbesian scholarship. Tom Sorell holds that:
19See P. Machamer, “Galileo and the Causes”; Dear, Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools.
20Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical Mind: Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s Medita-
tions” admirably teases out the separate inuences insofar as certainty and clarity are concerned.
21Ryan, The Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 102–103. Watkins, Hobbes’s system of ideas: a study in the
political signicance of philosophical theories.
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Hobbes was a rm believer in the unity of science, but he did not think that deductive
links kept the body of science whole. . . . That is, he did not suppose that the sciences
could all be ranged in a series that the mind could take in as it takes in a geometrical
demonstration. . . 22
The problem is there is evidence for both interpretive extremes in Hobbes, and this is
precisely why this debate has gone unsettled. Noel Malcolm provides a clear description
of the diculty:
If we attempted to follow Hobbes’ “method” through, ascending from one level of
knowledge to the next, we would nd that each new level required the introduction
of concepts which were simply not contained in the subject-matter of the previous
level. [For example,][p]hysics will give us the concept of “motion toward” and
“motion away from”; but only psychology will provide the concept of “desire” and
“fear.”23
Nevertheless, there have also been several attempts to bridge extremes. An appealing, but
relatively ignored, proposal is due to Peter Machamer and Spyros Sakellariadis (henceforth:
M&S).
In an essay on “The Unity of Hobbes Philosophy,” M&S respond to the above inter-
pretive dilemma by invoking Hobbes’s nominalism.24 Their argument is based on the
fact that for Hobbes the fundamental linguistic unit is the name and that “a universal
[name] gains its meaning from the various particular objects it supports[.]”25 Hobbes
may sometimes speak as if a single name can be applied to various objects because of
“their similitude in some quality or other accident,” but, as M&S stress, this similitude is a
consequence of dening the name under whose extension these objects fall. Dening a
name species how objects in its extension are to be conceived, and so understanding
of their similitude “in some quality or other accident” depends on the denition of the
quality or accident in question. It follows from this view that a name can apply across
domains which may appear essentially dierent to a non-nominalist, and by so doing
unify those domains.26 Moreover, no domain is privileged. The name does not apply
strictly in one domain but only loosely or metaphorically in another. Rather, the name
captures all objects in its extension equally. M&S write:
22Sorell, “Descartes, Hobbes and the Body of Natural Science,” 520.
23Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Science of Politics and his Theory of Politics,” 147. Malcolm’s view is consonant
with the mixed-mathematical view. In fact, I take the mixed-mathematical view defended in this paper
to provide a concrete model by which to articulate the introduction of new concepts at dierent levels of
Hobbes’s system. I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to clarify this point.
24P. Machamer and Sakellariadis, “The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy.”
25P. Machamer and Sakellariadis, “The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy,” 31.
26See also Leviathan §4.6. Pettit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, Ch. 2 explores
problems with this notion of similitude.
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The eects of this nominalism are readily seen in the case of the concept of motion.
“Motion” is a universal term and therefore as our knowledge of it ‘we have in
the rst place (its) denition’ (De Corpore, 70). Thus, through its application in
dierent realms we come to know about motion. For example, in the case of natural
philosophy, motion is the endeavor or motion of corporeal objects, dened as the
continual relinquishing and acquiring of places of the objects. In moral philosophy,
the motions are the endeavors or motions of the mind, namely ‘appetite. aversion,
love, benevolence, hope, fear, anger, emulation, envy, etc.’ (De Corpore, 71). The
fundamental law of motion, for example, refers both to the fact that corporeal objects
continue to endeavor to change their places unless hindered, and to the fact that
human beings continue to have appetites and aversions (both endeavors), and, unless
hindered, will change their place in order to accomplish the goals of those motions.27
The view is attractive, but not without it’s problems. First, M&S seem to assert both
that the meaning of Hobbes’s key terms is univocal across domains and that it (partially)
varies. For example, they contend that “universal terms, like ‘body’, ‘law’, ‘motion’, etc.,. . .
are used with the same meaning throughout Hobbes’s system.”28 But they also suggest
that “[t]he meaning of the term ‘body’ employed in any particular realm (e.g., politics) is
determined not only by that realm itself, but also by the other realms in which it applies
(e.g., natural philosophy).”29 The two are at odds. The second suggestion implies that the
term “body” is not used with the same meaning in the physical, moral, and political levels.
Rather, it has a wide, hybrid meaning that is narrowed when any domain is specied.
Similarly, according to the rst suggestion, if a term had the same meaning everywhere,
there would be no reason to consult other domains when trying to understand its meaning
in a given domain. Conceiving of it’s extension in one domain would be sucient. Its
meaning in one realm would not be partially determined “by the other realms in which it
applies.”
Second, and more importantly, M&S fail to account for the order of Hobbes’s system.
They cannot explain, for example, why one would need to know about the motion of
inanimate matter before reasoning about sense. On one hand, if the meanings of terms
were the same across domains, nothing about the application of a term in one domain
would have to be understood for its application in another. One could study, for example,
how animal motion has features of “motion” without knowing anything about the motion
of inanimate bodies. Knowing about the motion of inanimate bodies would add nothing
at all to one’s knowledge of “motion” in animals.30 And if one can reason about domains
27P. Machamer and Sakellariadis, “The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy,” 31–32. Hobbes sometimes presents
“scientia” as knowledge of causes and sometimes as knowledge of meanings. The latter allows knowledge of
motion to be part of scientia even when a causal denition of motion is unavailable. M&S skirt this issue
here, and so will I. For an account that stresses that causal reading, see Adams, “The Wax and the Mechanical
Mind: Reexamining Hobbes’s Objections to Descartes’s Meditations.”
28P. Machamer and Sakellariadis, “The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy,” 20, original emphasis; 32.
29P. Machamer and Sakellariadis, “The Unity of Hobbes’s Philosophy,” 31.
30Hobbes does allow some domains (like politics) to have this kind of independence, but certainly not all.
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independently, knowledge of those domains need not be ordered in any way. On the
other hand, if the meanings of terms were hybrid—so that “the meaning of [a] term. . .
is determined. . . by the other realms in which it applies,” one would need to study all
realms before fully understanding what a term means in a particular realm. Either way,
the ordering gets lost in M&S’s account.
Yet there is no context I am aware of in which Hobbes discusses the unity of his
system without explicitly highlighting its order. For example, in De Corpore, he writes:
[I]n the rst place those things be demonstrated, which immediately succeed to
universal denitions (in which is contained that part of philosophy which is called
philosophia prima). Next, those things which may be demonstrated by simple motion
(in which geometry consists). After geometry, such things as may be taught, or
shewed by manifest action, that is, by thrusting from, or pulling towards. And after
these, the motion or mutation of the invisible parts of things, and the doctrine of
sense and imaginations, and of the internal passions, especially those of men, in
which are comprehended the grounds of civil duties, or civil philosophy; which takes
up the last place. And that this method ought to be kept in all sorts of philosophy, is
evident from hence, that such things as I have said are to be taught last, cannot be
demonstrated, till such as are propounded to be rst treated of, be fully understood.31
As far I know, Hobbes is never explicitly concerned with “unity” (or any relevant cognates).
Rather, he is concerned with deductive order. M&S’s account requires modest modication.
This is where the mixed-mathematical model of system construction becomes useful.
4. m i x e d m at h e m at i c s
Although the term “mixed-mathematics” only became common currency in the renais-
sance, philosophical reection on the nature of optics, astronomy, and harmonics traces
back to Aristotle’s Physics and, more signicantly, Posterior Analytics. In the latter text,
Aristotle holds that scientic demonstrations can furnish true claims regarding a science’s
subject matter by showing what properties belong to it by virtue of the kind of thing it
is, its genus, not by virtue of any properties that are accidentally true of it. This entails
that, for the most part, the premises and conclusions of scientic demonstrations are
homogeneous—they concern the same genus. Thus, metaphysical truths only follow from
metaphysical premises, physical truths from physical premises, mathematical truths from
mathematical premises, etc.
See Sorell, “The Sciences in Hobbes’s Politics” and Malcolm, “Hobbes’s Science of Politics and his Theory of
Politics.”
31De Corpore §6.17. The above is partially quote by M&S, but they omit the important rst sentence.
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But Aristotle also admitted of exceptions. In certain sciences, truths regarding one
genus could be used in reasoning about another genus. For example, optics uses geomet-
rical truths to reason about visual rays and harmonics uses arithmetical truths to reason
about sounds. In each case, the demonstrations are said to cross-genera: they borrow
principles that, strictly speaking, apply only to one kind (namely, continuous or discrete
magnitude) and apply it to another kind (namely, visual ray or sound). Because optics
and harmonics borrowed principles from geometry and arithmetic, optics and harmonics
were said to “stand beneath the other,” pure mathematical sciences.32
The latinization of Aristotle’s “stand beneath the other” resulted in a technical term
that persevered to the early-modern period—“subalternation”—and a body of work built
on Aristotle’s relatively few comments on the matter. Robert Grosseteste, in particular,
theorized the unique status of the mixed-mathematical or subalternate sciences in language
that reverberated in many later commentaries, starting with Aquinas and reaching to
Suarez and the Coimbrans. According to Grosseteste:
A science, is subalternated to another, whose subject adds a condition onto the
subject of the subalternating science. . . which condition does not totally derive
from the nature of the subject of the subalternating [science], but is assumed from
without.33
Consider the science of optics. In geometrical optics, theorems of geometry are used to
deduce a broad range of claims about light rays and vision. Why geometry? Because light
rays and vision seem to travel in straight lines. If the entities and processes of optics were
not characterizable (at least partially) by geometrical concepts, geometry would have no
foothold. However, the entities and processes of optics cannot be wholly characterized by
geometrical concepts. If they were, there would be no distinction between the geometry
and optics. Put dierently, a study of geometrical optics must use principles that are not
essentially geometrical, if geometry and optics are to be dierent sciences. Here is a
common example, due to Richard McKirahan.34 In deducing claims about the apparent
size of objects, proofs in geometrical optics use the principle that the larger the angle an
object subtends in the visual eld, the larger it appears. Given this principle, geometrical
optics answers questions like: Given two unequal objects, in what range of positions will
the two appear equal? Or, how much smaller will an object appear if viewed obliquely?
Equally, geometrical optics can explain why objects can appear equal when they are
32See Posterior Analytics I.13. For an introduction to the topic see McKirahan, Principles and Proofs:
Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstrative Science, Randall, “The Development of Scientic Method in the School of
Padua The Development of Scientic Method in the School of Padua,” and South, “Zabarella, Prime Matter,
and the Theory of Regressus.”
33Grosseteste, Commentary on Posterior Analytics, I. 18, 41–45. See Laird, The Scientiae Mediae in Medieval
Commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Ch. 1.
34McKirahan, “Aristotle’s Subordinate Sciences.” The example is from Euclid’s Optics.
January 14, 2016 | 10 of 20
zvi.biener@uc.edu
not, or appear unequal when they are, an explanation that relies on the geometrical
congurations of the objects under study. The principle in question, however, is not
deducible from the axioms of geometry. Although it uses geometrical concepts (e.g., angle),
it is not a geometrical principle. Rather, it is an “added condition” that concerns the
operation of vision in the domain of optics. Combining this principle with the principles
of geometry allows us to answer optical questions, but neither the principle itself nor the
principles of pure geometry are separately sucient for the task.
Four main points are relevant here: First, one cannot have a lower, subalternated
science, without some principles peculiar to the its domain. Grosseteste and other
Aristotelians oered theories of induction to explain how the principles of subalternated
sciences are discovered, but the main point is that they do not come from higher sciences.35
They are assumed, as Grosseteste put it, from without. Many commentators put the same
point in terms of qualities and properties: the lower science must add some quality or
property to the higher science, as optics adds “visual” to the line studied by geometry.
Principles that characterize the added property—as the above principle characterizes the
property of ‘being seen’—can then be used in demonstrations alongside the principles of
the ‘higher’ science.
Second, principles from pure geometry are assumed within optics, they are not justi-
ed anew. Many commentators held that an optician is insulated from purely geometrical
worries, as a pure geometer is insulated from geometry’s optical application.36 It is the
job of the higher science to provide justied principles, but not to apply them; and it
is the job of the lower science to apply higher-order principles, but not to justify them.
Consequently, no result in optics can cast doubt on results from pure geometry and proofs
in pure geometry are, strictly speaking, beyond the purview of the optician, when she is
conned to her “proper business.”37 We will return to this disciplinary insulation in the
conclusion.
Third, in a demonstration that combines a higher and lower science to prove some
conclusion in the lower science, the higher is said to provide a deeper explanation of
the conclusion. What ‘deeper’ amounts to can vary from commentator to commentator,
but, broadly speaking, must answer to one of the Aristotelian causes. Often, the higher
sciences were said to provide demonstrations of “the reasoned fact,” “the why,” or simply
35I bracket a further discussion of the origins of the ‘extra conditions.’ For many working in a broadly
Aristotelian mold, the extra conditions were a result of induction, but a review is beyond my scope. The
same problem arises for Hobbes, of course, which I also bracket. For the ways in which induction can
yield appropriately general, and true, denitions and principles, see Bayer, “Coming to Know Principles in
"Posterior Analytics" II 19” and Charles, Aristotle on Meaning and Essence.
36This disciplinary insulation was crucial to the reception of the mixed-mathematical sciences in mid-
seventeenth-century Paris. See, for example, Dear, Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools and Garber,
“Defending Aristotle / Defending Society in Early 17th Century Paris.”
37Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Physics 2, 294.
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“the cause,” while the lower sciences provided demonstrations of “the [unexplained] fact”
or “the what.” This broadly causal requirement could appeal to formal, ecient, or even
nal causes.38
Fourth, and going back to our principal question, because optics, due to its subal-
ternation by geometry, is a kind of geometry, an optical demonstration doesn’t just use
the basic framework of a geometrical demonstration, it is a geometrical demonstration.
And as a geometrical demonstration, it comes with all the perks associated with pure
geometry: certainty, clarity, intersubjectivity, possible use as part of an analysis/synthesis,
etc.39
For Aristotle himself, only the mixed-mathematical sciences (and perhaps medicine)
were allowed to cross-genera. However, at the hands of the late scholastics, the concept
of subalternation came to have a broad application. By the 17th century, although the
exemplars of subalternation remained the mixed-mathematical sciences, subalternation
was used as a relation that could obtain between any two sciences when one borrows
principles from another and applies them in its own, peculiar domain. Subalternation
even came to apply to the relationship between metaphysics and the remainder of the
38The absence of material causes from the list is due to the fact that the lower science was also said to
provide the matter of the demonstration, while the higher science provided the form, or that the lower
science considered the objects of the higher science, but enmattered. Either way, appeal to a material cause in
the higher science would run afoul of several key characterizations of the subalternating relation. For a single
example, take Philoponus’s characterizations of the relation of arithmetic and harmonics: “[G]eometry and
arithmetic simply look at double and one-and-a-half and such [relations] separably, while the harmonicist,
since he studies such formulas (logos) as actually being properties [of something], cannot even think of
them without matter” (Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Physics 2, 227,1 9–13, emphasis added). The various terms
intended to capture the relation of causes in subalternating and subalternate sciences take their cue from
Posterior Analytics I 9, 76a10–16 and are re-workings of Aristotle’s ‘the fact’ ( ) and ‘the reason’ ( ).
39The inference from the ‘perks’ of a subalternating science to the ‘perks’ of a subalternated science is by
no means facile. Although I have lumped certainty, clarity, intersubjectivity and use in analysis/synthesis
together, authors may explain the presence of one through the presence of others, and may even explain the
presence of all through the presence of more fundamental features like proper appeal to causes. For example,
Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms, 110–119, shows that Ioannis de Guevara, “a priest, friend of
Galileo, and Aristotelian,” defended the certainty of mechanics (which he conceived to be subalternate to
geometry) by rst pressing mechanical demonstration into syllogistic form, and then using the machinery
of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics to argue that mechanical demonstrations make proper use of middle
terms and are thus properly causal. Since they are causal, they can be used to infer causes from eects
(demonstratio quia, analysis) and eects from causes (demonstratio propter quid, synthesis), and thus form
an analytic-synthetic chain (the regressus). For Guevara, it is ultimately the regressus that guarantees the
certainty of mechanical knowledge. I take Hattab’s treatment of Guevara to support the current discussion,
by showing how subalternated sciences were thought to inherit not only principles, but the epistemic
characteristics of their subalternating sciences. I thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. The
above inference also relies on the idea that pure geometry itself rises to the level of scientia, a notion that
was not at all above dispute. In fact, battles regarding the scientic nature of the subalternated science were
often part of battles concerning the scientic nature of pure mathematics; on the Quaestio de Certitudine
Mathematicarum (Disciplinarum), see Mancuso, Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the
Seventeenth Century. For Hobbes’s relationship to the regressus and his understanding of the benets of a
“mathematical” method see also Hattab, “Hobbes’s and Zabarella’s Methods: A Missing Link.”
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sciences. Eustachius a Sancto Paolo, just to take a non-innovative, expository writer,
noted:
Amongst Mathematics there are those which are called impure, or which consider
quantity with some type of quality; indeed, Music, and Optics are subalternated
by pure Mathematics, by Arithmetic or Geometry. And, nally, all sciences are
subalternated by Metaphysics.40
Although opinions diered regarding the extent of the subalternation relation (Francisco
Suarez, for example, held that metaphysics does not subalternate all other sciences), it is
clear that subalternation was part of the lingua franca of late scholasticism. It provided a
way to think about inferences that crossed genera, and thus a way to think about broad
disciplinary relations.
5. h o b b e s ’ s ‘ s y s t e m ’ a n d m i x e d - m at h e m at i c s
I’d like to suggest that one of the things Hobbes took from geometry and from his clear
knowledge of scholasticism was this distinctly non-reductive, although nevertheless
deductive, conception of inference, and with it a non-reductive, but unied, conception of
knowledge.41 The approach has the power to span the two interpretive poles mentioned
earlier. On the one hand, we should not expect all of Hobbes’s sciences to boil down to a
few rst principles. Taking mixed-geometry as a model does not entail, unlike taking
pure-geometry as a model, that all conclusions must boil down to a nite set of axioms
about a single, albeit highly abstract, domain. On the other hand, the various ssures be-
tween physics and physiology, or physiology and psychology, do not invalidate Hobbes’s
project as broadly geometrical. Such ssures were part and parcel of mixed-geometry
and were caused by the addition of conditions at each transition from a subalternating to
a subalternated science. In the quote below, Hobbes considers only “true physics,” but
his understanding of mixed-mathematics is such that any truly mixed science cannot
be reduced to the abstract principles of the pure one. Rather, it takes those pure prin-
ciples and adds ones peculiar to its more specialized domain. Hobbes also expands, as
many scholastics and novatores before him, the number of the mixed sciences from their
paradigmatic instances to include also physics, as a whole:
[S]ince one cannot proceed to the consequences or motions without a knowledge
of quantity, which is geometry; . . . Therefore physics (I mean true physics), that
40Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, de rebus Dialecticis, Ethicis, Physicis, &
Metaphysicis. I 242.
41See Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes’
Natural Philosophy for Hobbes’s engagement with late Aristotelianism.
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depends on geometry, is usually numbered among the mixed mathematics [mathe-
maticas mixtas]. . . [T]hose mathematics are pure which (like geometry and arith-
metic) revolve around quantities in the abstract . . . those mathematics are mixed
which in their reasoning also consider any quality of the subject, as is the case with
astronomy, music, physics, and the parts of physics that can vary on account of the
variety of species and the parts of the universe.42
The idea that specic domains are constructed by “adding conditions” to higher, more
generic domains can account for the ordering of Hobbes’s system, can retain its unity,
and can explain his abiding concern with the example of mixed mathematics. Another
famous Hobbesian take on his Elements makes the point plain:
Having completed this section, On Man, I have nally fullled my promise. For
you now possess the prime Elements of my philosophy in all its divisions and
subdivisions. Moreover, it happens that the two parts whereof this section consists
are very dissimilar. . . They are therefore somewhat abruptly conjoined; but this was
necessary, granted the method of my work as a whole.
For man is not just a natural body, but also a part of the state, or (as I put it) of the
body politic; for that reason he had to be considered as both man and citizen, that is,
the rst principles of physics had to be conjoined with those of politics [ultima physicae
cum principiis politicae conjungenda erant]. . . 43
Hobbes’s stated procedure is to take denitions in “higher” domains and add principles
specic to lower domains. We also see this in Hobbes’s characterization of the ner
transition from Part II of De Corpore (“First Grounds of Philosophy”, which include general
concepts like velocity and cause) to Part III (“Proportions of Motion and Magnitude”,
which include uniform and accelerated motion).44 In brief: The rst two sections of Part
III are entitled: “1. Repetition of some principles of the doctrine of motion set down
above” and “2. Other principles added to these.”45 The rst section repeats the causal
and kinematic principles of motion in articulated in Part II, Chapter 8, and the second
adds a new concept: endeavor (conatus). Conatus is dened as “motion made in less space
and time than can be given”, and it is the addition of conatus, a more highly specied
type of motion, to the general principles of geometry that yields the variety of specic
motions studies in Part III. For example, “uniform motion” is dened as an equality of
impetus—a quantity of conatus—at every point of an object’s trajectory.46 Conatus itself
is further specied in the transition to Part IV of De Corpore (“Physics”). As the conatus
42De Homine, Ch. X; OL, II 93–94; Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), 42, slightly modied,
emphasis added.
43De Homine, preface; OL, II v; Hobbes, Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive), 35, emphasis added.
44See Jesseph, “Hobbesian Mechanics” for how motion can be part of Hobbes’s First Philosophy.
45De Corpore, Ch. 15. OL, I 175.
46De Corpore, 16.1; OL, I 184. Hobbes also adds that conatus must be towards something in De Corpore
15.5, OL, I 182.
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of an inanimate body is its minutest directional motion, the conatus of an animate body
is an appetite when it is in the direction of an object that promotes the life-sustaining
vital motion of the blood, and aversion when it is away from an object that inhibits vital
motion. Appetite and aversion are still conati, but their targets and eects are more
specic than conati in general. In Leviathan, appetites and aversions form the basis of
Hobbes’s psychology, thus also enabling the transition to statecraft, which is yet further
down the subalternation chain.47
This approach has the promise of holding on to what is insightful in M&S’s approach,
and addressing the problem of order. As M&S emphasize, Hobbes’s terms do have the
same core meaning in every domain, and so principles concerning, say, conatus, apply
in exactly the same way to natural philosophy and politics, or inanimate matter and
living things. However, each domain adds additional conditions that are peculiar to that
domain: the endeavor of an animate body is not identical to the endeavor of an inanimate
one, although each is an endeavor. The endeavor of an animate body is directed towards
promotion of vital motion, motion which does not exist in the inanimate world. Yet
both sustain the body undergoing them, as they are able. The problem of order is solved
because the earlier, higher domains provide a more general account of the concept in
question, which the lower sciences further specify. And so, the adding of conditions
provides an appropriate criterion for ordering. This structure answers to the other points
made about mixed-mathematics in §4. A higher science provides the principle, say,
that conatus is minute directional motion, which lower sciences take for granted. A
discussion of appetite in the context of psychology no longer needs to include general
deliberation about the nature of motion, since the properties which belong to the genus
have already been determined. This provides the disciplinary insulation characteristic of
mixed mathematics. Given Hobbes’s emphasis on causal denitions, the higher sciences
also provides the reason why certain claims are true in the lower sciences. They specify
causes.
6. c o n c l u s i o n
Before closing, I need to address a historical problem. If subalternation was part of
the lingua franca of late scholasticism, why should we think Hobbes xed on it as
an organizing disciplinary principle by thinking about mixed-mathematics, and not by
reading one of the many available scholastic treatments of the unity and structure of the
47Strictly speaking, subalternation is a binary, asymmetrical, and transitive relation, so that if science C is
subalternated to B and B is subalternated to A, C is subalternated to science A. This means that sciences
‘lower’ in Hobbes’s Elements are subalternated to all the sciences above them, up to rst philosophy.
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sciences? My answer has two components. First, the question is somewhat misleading.
Even within scholastic treatises and textbooks, the exemplars for subalternation were
the mixed-mathematical sciences. I know of no discussion of subalternation that does
not at some point mention the mixed-mathematical sciences as clear instances of the
concept under discussion. With regards to disciplinary classication, (and unlike the case
of substantial forms, for example) being impressed with mixed-mathematics did not stand
opposed to taking scholastic doctrines to heart. Hobbes could have very well learned
about the disciplinary and demonstrative status of mixed-mathematics from sources that
did not set out to champion the new sciences.
There is also another answer. Hobbes began thinking of a system of philosophy not
during or shortly after his studies, nor while in Bacon’s employ, nor while translating
Thucydides, but while in and out of Paris, precisely when he was immersed in the culture
of mixed mathematics that permeated Mersenne’s circle. For Mersenne and his circle,
however, championing mixed-mathematics was politically plausible only because of the
science’s curious disciplinary status: by virtue of their rank in the disciplinary hierarchy,
the new mixed sciences did not challenge metaphysical and theological authority.48 A
subalternating science, recall, was thought to be insulated from the sciences it subalter-
nated. And so, if optical demonstrations could not cast doubt on geometrical proofs, they
could certainly not cast doubt on the higher truths of theology and metaphysics. It was
this feature of the mixed-mathematical sciences that rendered them safe: by practicing
mixed-mathematics in the 1630s, Mersenne and friends were not only not challenging
metaphysical and theological doctrine, orthodoxy suggested that they could not possibly
do so! The Parisian Hobbes would have thus been uniquely positioned to think about the
way in which demonstrations and disciplinary boundaries come together in the variety
of geometrical sciences. Emulating geometry went hand in hand with avoiding “oensive
novelty”, as the epistle dedicatory to De Corpore claims to do.
I close by returning to the mathematization of early-modern philosophy. A good
deal of literature is guided by a dual vision of early-modern mathematization eorts. On
the one side stand Galileo, Huygens, and Newton; mixed-mathematicians who sought
piecemeal solutions to particular problems and who happily dispensed with essences and
ultimate causes. On the other side stand Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza; philosophers
who sought to build complete, architectonic systems that grounded all that there is in
its metaphysical roots. I think focusing on the demonstrative and disciplinary status of
mixed-mathematics suggests that, at least in Hobbes’s case, the two were not as opposed
as they now seem. In fact, the very structure of some architectonic systems might have
been suggested by the mixed-mathematical approach. To put it tendentiously, some
48Garber, “Defending Aristotle / Defending Society in Early 17th Century Paris”; Garber, “On the Frontlines
of the Scientic Revolution: How Mersenne Learned to Love Galileo.”
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philosophers might have learned to philosophize from mixed-mathematics.
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